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The Changing Political Economy of Party Membership 
 
Introduction 
 
  Although few scholars would dispute from an empirical point of view the fact that 
parties change their electoral strategies, ideological stances and organizational structures 
over time, there is not much agreement on how these changes, above all party 
organizational change, have to be understood from a theoretical point of view. This is 
especially true with regard to the transformations that party organizations have undergone 
from the early 1970s on. In fact, although party organizational changes in the past three 
decades have generally been considered to be signs of  the so called party crisis
1, the 
agreement on this analytical perspective is far from being unanimous. The party crisis 
interpretation of parties’ organizational changes has recently been challenged by Katz 
and Mair
2. These scholars remarked that the party crisis is predicated on the assumption 
that the mass party of social integration represents the only model of party organization 
and that any departure from the experience of the mass party model indicates the failure 
of the party tout court. In contrast to this interpretation, Katz and Mair pointed out that 
                                                           
1 The idea of party crisis is a multifaceted one. In his discussion of the party crisis literature, Angelo 
Panebianco suggested that the crisis of political parties derives from their increasing inability to perform 
their traditional functions. On this see, Panebianco, Modelli di Partito, Bologna, il Mulino, 1982. For a 
discussion of the traditional functions performed by political parties, see Otto Kirchheimer, “The 
Transformation of Western European Party Systems”, in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), 
Political Parties and PoliticalDevelopment, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 395-421. For 
a critical assessment of the party crisis literature, see Hans Daalder, “A Crisis of Party ?”, Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 15, pp. 269-288, 1992.  
2 See  Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization: the Emergence of the 
Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n. 1, 1995, pp. 5-28; see also Peter Mair, “Party Organizations: From 
Civil Society to the State”, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize. Change and 
Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London, SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 1-22. 
Similarly Piero Ignazi suggested that the party crisis concerns only one type of parties rather than the party 
  1regardless of its importance, the mass party represents only one historically limited stage 
in the development of party organizations
3. Therefore, departures from the mass party 
model are not necessarily the symptoms of an irreversible party crisis, but might instead 
be conceived as parties’ attempts to adapt to the changes in the environment in which 
they operate.  
In this respect, Katz and Mair hypothesized that two major changes have reshaped 
the environment in which parties operate in the past three decades. The first change 
resulted from the transformation of the relationship between parties and society, which is 
now characterized by greater detachment between parties and society. The second change 
resulted from the transformation of the relationship between parties and the state, which 
have become increasingly inter-penetrated. By reshaping parties’ habitat, these two 
changes have created the conditions for the emergence of a new type of party, for a new 
stage in the development of parties, or rather a new party model that Katz and Mair 
defined as “cartel party”
4. 
More precisely, the cartel party hypothesis elaborated by Katz and Mair postulates 
the existence of a causal pattern: first, parties and society become increasingly detached 
from each other and this detachment is particularly noticeable with regard to party 
membership. In fact, as Katz and Mair pointed out Western European parties have 
experienced “a general decline in the levels of participation and involvement in party 
                                                                                                                                                                             
per sé. See, Piero Ignazi, “The crisis of parties and the rise of new political parties”, in Party Politics, vol. 
2, n. 4, pp. 549-566, 1996.  
3 On this see, Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three 
Faces of Party Organization”, The American Review of Politics, vol. 14, 1993, pp. 593-617; see also 
Richard Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization: the Emergence of the Cartel 
Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n. 1, 1995, pp. 5-28. 
4 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization: the Emergence of the Cartel 
Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n. 1, 1995, pp. 5-28. 
  2activity”
5, a decline that is, in part, explained by the fact that party membership is no 
longer economically efficient for parties. This transformation is associated with, and to a 
certain extent caused by, a second albeit equally important transformation in the 
organization and in the functioning of political parties: parties have become increasingly 
dependent on (and inter-penetrated with) the state and its resources. The cartellization of 
parties, the formation of the cartel, represents the following stage in this causal pattern: 
parties collude, thus forming the cartel, in their attempt to prevent divisive issues from 
emerging, to resist change and, ultimately, to protect the system that they established and 
in which they prosper. 
The purpose of the present paper is twofold: on the one hand I plan to analyze the 
detachment between parties and society as reflected by party membership decline, while, 
on the other hand, I plan to investigate some of the factors that may have led to party 
membership decline. In order to do so, I will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will 
present Katz’s economic explanation for party membership decline. In this section I will 
argue that the decline in the size of party membership is associated, among other things, 
with a decreasing demand for party members, which, in turn, is a function of the 
vanishing benefits and the rising costs associated with party membership. In the second 
section, I will discuss some measures of party membership size and party membership 
change as well as the data that I will use in the course of the present analysis. The third 
section provides some evidence, gathered from both aggregate and survey data, on the 
party membership levels and trends in 11 Western European countries. The data 
presented in this section sustain Katz and Mair’s claim that Western European parties 
have experienced “a general decline in the levels of participation and involvement in 
                                                           
5 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization”, op. cit., p.15.  
  3party activity”. In the fourth and the fifth sections, I will provide some evidence as to the 
changing economy of party membership. The data presented in these two sections show 
that, from the point of view of the party, party membership has become increasingly 
inefficient, because the benefits associated with party members have declined while the 
costs have increased. Similarly, the data analysis suggests that party membership has 
become increasingly inefficient also from the point of view of the party members, 
because, even in this case the benefits associated with party membership have decreased, 
while the costs have increased. In the sixth and final section I will draw some conclusions 
as to the significance of my findings. 
 
The Political Economy of Party Membership 
In 1990, Katz proposed an ‘economic’ explanation for the decline in the number of party 
members. According to Katz, the decline in the number of members reflected a 
transformation of the perceived costs and benefits for both parties (and, of course, party 
leaders) and party members. Specifically, Katz argued that the costs of party membership 
have increased and the benefits have declined both from the point of view of parties and 
from that of party members. Therefore, as the utility attached to party membership 
declined, the number of party members also declined because parties were less 
committed to recruit and retain party members, and also because would-be members had 
fewer incentives to join a party
6.  
Katz’s article sparked a renewed interest in the long-neglected study of party 
membership and several studies were developed either within or in reaction to Katz’s 
                                                           
6 Richard S. Katz, “Party as linkage: A vestigial function?”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 
18, 1990, pp. 143-161. 
  4framework of analysis
7.  For example, in her analysis of the British and the German party 
members, Scarrow argued that from the point of view of parties and party leaders there 
are several benefits that are still associated with party membership. A large membership 
base may provide legitimacy, electoral, outreach, financial, labor, linkage, innovation and 
personnel benefits
8. In their analysis of the Danish party members, Bille and Pedersen 
found that there is great variation in the extent to which members participate in party 
activities and thus represent an asset for their parties
9. According to Bille and Pedersen, 
party members provide significant outreach and innovation benefits, while they do not 
provide major financial or direct electoral benefits
10. 
These analyses refined the demand side of the argument developed by Katz. These 
analyses have in fact shown that in some respects parties benefit from their membership 
base. And in so far as this is the case, and provided that these benefits of party 
membership are not exceeded by the costs, parties still have an incentive to have some 
members and, therefore, to preserve some links with society. However, neither Scarrow 
nor Bille and Pedersen have paid much attention to the supply side of the argument 
developed by Katz, that is to whether the costs and the benefits of party membership have 
                                                           
7 Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair et alii, “The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960-
1990”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 22, n. 3, 1992, pp. 329-345; Richard S. Katz and Peter 
Mair (eds.), Party Organizations. A Data Handbook, London, Sage, 1992; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair 
(eds.), How Parties Organize, London, Sage, 1994: Susan Scarrow, Parties and their Members. Organizing  
for victory in Britain and Germany, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996; Peter Mair and Ingrid van 
Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000”, Party Politics, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 
5-21; Karina Pedersen, “How Do Party Members Contribute to Parties?”, Institut for Statskundskab, 
Arbejdspapir, 2001/9; Lars Bille and Karina Pedersen, “Danish Party Members: Sleeping or Active 
Partners?”, Institut for Statskundskab, Arbeidspapir, 2002/14; Karina Pedersen, Party Membership 
Linkage. The Danish Case, Ph. D. dissertation submitted in December 2002 and accepted for defence of the 
PhD degree in February 2003, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.  
8 Susan Scarrow, Parties and their Members. Organizing  for victory in Britain and Germany, op. cit., pp. 
40-50; a similar point can be found in Karina Pedersen, “How Do Party Members Contribute to Parties?”, 
op. cit.   
9 Lars Bille and Karina Pedersen, “Danish Party Members: Sleeping or Active Partners?”, op. cit., p. 23. 
10 Lars Bille and Karina Pedersen, “Danish Party Members: Sleeping or Active Partners?”, op. cit., p. 23. 
  5changed in such a way that would-be party members have less of an incentive to join the 
party. The purpose of this paper is to show how changes in both the demand and the 
supply of party membership have led to the decline in the party membership levels.       
 
Party Membership: Measures and Data 
  In this paper, I will analyze the size of party membership and its transformations 
over time on the basis of both aggregate and survey data. The size of party membership 
will be measured by two basic indicators
11constructed with aggregate data. The first 
indicator is simply the total number of members (M), which is calculated by summing up 
the number of members of all the parties in a given year for each of the countries 
included in our sample. My second indicator measures instead the total number of party 
members as a proportion (M/E) of the whole national electorate (E). The figures 
concerning the total number of members, the size of national electorates, and the M/E 
ratio for a selected number of years from the 1970-1999 period are presented in Table 1. 
Party membership change will be measured on the basis of three indicators 
constructed with aggregate data: the first is just the change in the total number of 
members from the first year in the 1970s and the most recent year in the 1990s for which 
data were collected. For example, the change in M in Italy has been of about 2,063,142 
members from a peak of 4,037,182 members recorded in 1970 to just 1,974,000 members 
recorded in 1998. The second measure measures instead the change in M as a percentage 
of the original membership. In the British case, this indicator takes a value of - 64.73, 
since British parties lost by 1998 about 1,541,889 of the 2,381,889 members that they had 
  6in 1974. The third and last indicator of party membership change measures the 
transformation in the M/E ratio from its initial to its most recent value. In the Danish 
case, for example, this indicator has a value of - 9.08 because while the total number of 
members in 1970 were 14.22 % of the whole Danish electorate, in 1998 the total number 
of members was just 5.14 % of the overall national electorate. The figures concerning the 
change in the total number of members, in the total number of members as a percentage 
of the original membership and in the M/E are reported in Table 2.  
Aggregate membership figures were analyzed for 11 Western European countries 
for which, membership figures could be collected for at least a year in each of the past 
three decades. My sample includes all of the 9 countries
12 that were analyzed by Katz
13 in 
1990, and 10 of the 11 countries
14 analyzed by Katz, Mair et alii
15 in 1992.  
  As it was previously noted, party membership size and its changes will also be 
analyzed on the basis of survey data taken from four German surveys (conducted in 1969, 
1972, 1994 and 1998), from three Italian surveys (conducted in 1968, 1972 and 1996), 
from seven Dutch surveys (1971, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998) and from the 
British surveys (conducted in 1983, 1987 and 1997). For each of these countries, the size 
of party membership is simply measured on the basis of the number of self-reported party 
members. Data are reported in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 For a discussion on the advantages and the liabilities of these and other measures of party membership 
strength, see Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair et alii, “The membership of political parties in European 
democracies, 1960-1990”, European Journal of Political Research, 22, 1992, pp. 329-345. 
12 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
13 Richard S. Katz, “Party as linkage: A vestigial function?”, European Journal of Political Research, 18, 
1990, pp. 143-161. 
14 In addition to the nine countries analyzed by Katz in his “Party as linkage”, op.cit., the study conducted 
by Katz, Mair et alii also analyzed Finland and Ireland, see Katz, Mair et alii, “The membership of politicl 
parties”, op. cit., p.334. Finland was excluded from my sample and replaced by France, which had not been 
investigated in the two above mentioned studies. 
  7 
Party Membership: Levels and Trends 
Looking at the total number of members, it is possible to note a general 
downward trend in the 1970-2000 period: the overall number of members has fallen in 
every country with the exception of Germany, where it has increased by 573,201 
members. This decline has been particularly large in the larger Western European 
democracies: Italian parties lost 2,063,142 members, British parties lost 1,541,889 
members and French parties lost 1,222,128 members. On the contrary, the loss of 
members has been considerably smaller in the small Western European democracies: 
Irish parties lost 27,856 members, Dutch parties lost 63,725 members and Belgian parties 
lost only 13,868 members. Data are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The analysis of the change in the total number of members as percentage of the original 
members displays a very similar picture: party membership levels declined in every 
country with the exception of Germany, where it increased by 47.7%. Interestingly 
enough, even this set of data shows that party membership decline has been particularly 
marked in the larger Western European countries: it decreased by 64.73% in the United 
Kingdom, by 64.59% in France and by 51.1% in Italy. More interestingly, a very similar 
pattern can be observed in Denmark, where party membership has declined by 56.66% 
from its 1970 value, and in Norway, where membership level declined by 47.49%. On the 
contrary, the change in the number of members as percentage of the original membership 
has been less impressive in the other small Western European states: it declined by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 The study in question is Richard S. Katz, Peter Mair et alii, “The membership of political parties in 
European democracies, 1960-1990”, op. cit. 
  828.05% in Sweden, by 24.47 % in Ireland, by 21.20% in Austria, by 17.79% in the 
Netherlands and only by 2.76% in Belgium. Data are presented in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Tables 1 and 2 also provide the figures concerning the change in the M/E ratio in all of 
the countries under study. The analysis of these data also testifies to the vanishing of 
party members in Western Europe. The analysis of the M/E ratio suggests three 
interesting observations. The first is that there is a clear, European-wide, downward trend 
in the number of party members as a percentage of the national electorate in 10 of the 11 
countries under study. The German case is somewhat exceptional even in this respect, as 
the German data suggest that party membership levels have either stagnated or modestly 
diminished in the 1970-1998 period, but have not undergone a decline comparable to that 
experienced in the other Western European countries. The second observation is that the 
decline in the levels of party membership has followed three different patterns. The first 
pattern, which can be observed in 7 countries
16 out of 11, is that of a constant, monotonic 
decline over time. The second pattern, which can be observed in 3 of the countries
17 
under consideration, is that of a period of growth followed by a period of decline. 
Interestingly, both the Austrian and the German levels of party membership reached their 
peak in 1980, while in the Irish case the peak was reached in 1987. The third pattern, 
which can be observed only in the Belgian case, is that of period of increase followed by 
a period of decline, which were then followed by a second period of increase and a 
second period of decline. The third, and final observation, is that the decline in the M/E 
ratio has profoundly altered the pictured displayed by the data of the early 1970s. In fact, 
                                                           
16 These countries are, respectively: Denmark,France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
  9in the early 1970s, one country had a membership rate of over 20 % (Austria), three 
between 10 and 20% (Denmark, Italy and Norway), five between 5 and 10% (Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and only two countries had a 
membership level of under 5% (Germany and the Netherlands). By the late 1990s, no 
country had a membership level of over 20%, only one country had a membership rate 
between 10 and 20% (Austria), four countries between 5 and 10% (Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden) and six countries had a membership rate of under 5% (France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).  
The picture displayed by the survey data is quite similar to the picture portrayed 
by the aggregate data: there is a marked decline in the levels (of self-reported party) 
membership in Italy, in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, but not in Germany. 
Data are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The Vanishing Demand for Party Members 
Although the data analyzed in the previous section show that there has been an 
overall decline in party membership levels, they do not provide any evidence as to why 
such a decline has occurred. Building on my previous discussion of the economy of party 
membership, I plan to test whether the overall decline in the levels of party members is 
associated, if not caused, with a decline in both the demand and the supply of party 
members. While in the next section I will to assess whether the supply of party members 
ha become increasingly economically inefficient, in this section I will focus on the 
demand-side of the problem. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 These countries are, respectively: Austria, Germany and Ireland. 
  10Specifically, I plan to test whether party membership decline can be ascribed to 
the vanishing of the benefits that parties once derived from a large membership base, to 
the rising costs associated with party members, or to the interaction of the above 
mentioned factors. The analysis of the benefits associated with party membership will 
focus on the electoral, financial and political benefits allegedly associated with party 
member, while the analysis of the costs will focus on the demands that members place on 
the party. 
The first benefit associated with party membership is that party members are a 
highly loyal segment of the electorate and they represent, thus, an asset on which parties 
can capitalize in elections. The data presented in Table 4 suggest that this is indeed the 
case. The 1968 and 1972 Italian data allow to construct two different measures of party 
voting loyalty: the first measure records the percentage of respondents who reported to 
have always voted for the same party before respectively the 1968 elections and the 1972 
elections, while the second measure records which percentage of 1968 voters had voted 
for the same party in the 1963 national elections and the percentage of 1972 voters who 
had voted for the same party in the 1968 elections. The first measure of party voting 
loyalty is also constructed with the 1971 and 1981 Dutch data, which also allow to 
measure the percentage of 1981 voters had voted for the same party in the 1977. The 
second measure is instead the only indicator of party voting loyalty that could be 
constructed for the 1996 Italian data, for the 1969, 1972 and 1994 German data, for the 
1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 Dutch data, and for the 1983, 1987 and 1997 British 
data. In each case, party members are significantly more loyal voters than are ordinary 
citizens. 
  11[Table 4 about here] 
 
  Although the data reported in Table 4 sustain the claim that party members are 
more loyal than ordinary citizens, they also show that party members’ voting loyalty has 
markedly declined from the late 1960s and early 1970s to the mid-1990s in Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands. This point is corroborated by the analysis of both measures of 
party voting loyalty. The analysis of the first measure of party voting loyalty shows that 
from 1971 to 1981, the percentage of Dutch party members who reported to have always 
voted for the same party before that election dropped from more than 94% in 1971 to just 
61.5% in 1981. A similar, albeit less dramatic trend, can be observed in Italy where the 
percentage of members reporting to have always voted for the same party declined from 
almost 96% to 89% in the four years between the 1968 and the 1972 elections. 
Consistently with the picture drawn by these data, the analysis of the second measure of 
party voting loyalty shows a decline in the voting loyalty of party members. The 
percentage of German party members voting for the same party in two consecutive 
elections dropped from 92 % in 1969 to 81.5 % in 1994, while the percentage of Italian 
party members voting for the same party in two consecutive elections fell from 92.7% in 
1972 to 81.5% in the 1996 elections. An analogous conclusion can reached in the Dutch 
case, where the percentage of party members voting for the same party in the 1994 and in 
the 1998 elections was inferior to the percentage of 1971 party members reporting to 
have always voted for the same party. This finding is of some importance for the purpose 
of this study, because it shows that  party members are no longer the safe vote reserve 
  12that they used to be and, as a consequence, they have become a less valuable asset in the 
eyes of parties and party leaders.   
Important as these data may be, they fall short of showing whether the greater 
stability of party members’ electoral behavior is determined by party membership as such 
or whether it is associated with party membership because they are both produced by the 
same, underlying, set of factors. In other words, party members’ electoral loyalty should 
be ascribed to their being members or to the fact that they have a strong partisan 
attachment? In order to answer this question, I analyze the relationship between party 
voting loyalty and party membership by controlling for the strength of party identification 
in the 1994 German elections, in the 1996 Italian elections, in the 1998 Dutch elections in 
the 1997 British elections
18. In the German case, the control for the strength of party 
identification radically transforms the value gamma correlation from 0.09 for the 
uncontrolled relationship to 1.0, -0.42 and –0.42 for the three levels of party 
identification for which the computation could be performed
19. In the Italian case, the 
control for the strength of party identification reduces the gamma correlation from 0.32 
for the uncontrolled relationship to 0.22, -0.10 and –0.11 for the three levels of 
identification. In the Dutch case, the control for the strength of party adherence 
transforms the value of the gamma correlation from 0.70 for the uncontrolled relationship 
between party membership and voting loyalty, to 1.0, 0.22 and 0.00 for the three levels of 
                                                           
18 Note that the variable measuring the strength of party identification is trichotomous for both the 1996 
Italian elections and the 1997 British elections, while it is not in the German case. Note also that, in the 
case of the 1998 Dutch elections instead of measuring the strength of party identification, I measured the 
strength of adherence. The stength of adherence was also measured on the basis of a trichotomous variable, 
taking value 1 for respondents repoirting to be very convinced adherents, value 2 for respondents reporting 
to be convinced adherents and value 3 for those respondents who reported to be adherent but not 
convinced. 
  13strength in party adherence. In the British case, the control for the strength of party 
identification reduces the gamma correlation from 0.68 for the uncontrolled relationship 
to 0.63, 0.55 and 0.08 for the three levels of identification. These findings are of some 
interest because they show that although party members are among the most loyal voters 
that a party may have, their loyalty is not a function of their membership. The 
relationship between party voting loyalty and party membership is a spurious one as both 
variables are affected by the same set of underlying factors, so that once these other 
factors are controlled the net effect of membership on loyalty varies from little to none. 
This has, of course, important implications with regard to the relationship between parties 
and party members, because if members no longer provide the benefits for which they 
were a valuable resource in the past, parties have little incentive to recruit and maintain a 
large membership base.   
  The second benefit associated with party membership is that party members may 
provide significant contributions to party finance
20. This was especially true in the past 
when membership fees and members’ donations to political parties were the major, if not 
the only, source of resources with which parties could finance their activities. However, 
the picture has profoundly changed in the past four decades with the introduction of state 
subventions to party finance either as a reimbursement for parties’ electoral expenses or 
as a financial contribution to parties’ ordinary activities
21. In fact, as the data presented in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 These three levels are very strong, somewhat strong, medium; while the gamma correlation could not be 
computed when the strength of party identification is somewhat weak and weak, because the strength of 
party identification never takes these values for party members. 
20 For a more extensive discussion of party finance and its transformations in the past four decades, see the 
next paper. 
21 A good source of information, in this respect, is represented by Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), 
Party Organizations. A Data Handbook, London, SAGE Publications, 1992. Additional information can be 
found in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1994;  see also Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.), Comparing 
  14Table 5 show, a considerable portion of the expenses Italian parties have to sustain each 
year to finance their electoral and ordinary activities, is now covered by state subventions 
instead of being covered by members’ dues and contributions. This means that, as 
important as membership fees and contributions still may be, they are certainly not as 
important as they were when they represented the only way to finance parties activities 
and, in the Italian case, one might actually wonder whether they matter at all. This has 
profound implications for the present analysis because it suggests that from 1974, when 
public financing of political parties was introduced, to the late 1990s, when the most 
recent piece of party finance legislation has been enacted by the Italian Parliament, the 
financial benefits associated with party membership have dramatically declined, if not 
vanished altogether. Italian parties no longer need members to finance their activities, 
because most, if not all, of the financial resources that they need to perform their tasks 
and activities are provided by the state
22.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, London, SAGE Publications, 1996, pp.38-41. 
For a discussion, see Richard S. Katz, “Party Organizations and Finance”, in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. 
Niemi and Pippa Norris (eds.), Comparing Democracies, op. cit., pp. 107-133. 
22 Italian parties received a reimbursement for electoral expenses and a contribution for their ordinary 
activities from 1974, when public financing of political parties was introduced, to 1993, when the 
contribution to parties’ordinary activities was abolished by the referendum. The party finance legislation 
was then modified by the law n.2 of January 2, 1997, which introduced, in addition to the above mentioned 
reimbursement for the electoral expenses, a semi-public or semi-private form of contribution to political 
parties. Art. 2.3 of this law estblished that all parties that are represented in the Chamber of Deputies or in 
the Senate by at least one member are eligible to receive a contribution proportional to the number of votes 
won in the previous elections. The costs of this contribution to party finance were charged to a fund which 
was created by citizens’ voluntary contribution (0.4% of the IRPEF). This legislative provision has come 
under some severe criticism and it has been modified and integrated by a later legislative act. What remains 
true, however, from 1974 and 1999 is that while the reimbursement for electoral expenses and the 
contribution to parties’ordinary activities were recorded as ‘state subventions’ in the party budgets, the 
yearly contributions that each parliamentary group receives from the Parliament were not always recorded 
in this way or in a way that would disclose the ‘public’origin of this money. The analysis of the budget of 
Rinnovamento Italiano from 1996 to 1999 is quite emblematic in this respect, as the Parliament’s 
contributions to the parliamentary group of Rinnovamento Italiano have always been recorded in the 
budget as ‘contributions by non-members’. This budgetary recording has important implications for the 
study of party finance, because by hiding the public origin of the Parliament’s yearly contributions it 
undermines our ability to provide better estimates of Italian party finance, although it suggests that Italian 
parties’dependency on state resources is much larger than official budgets suggest. 
  15[Table 5 about here] 
The German case is quite different from the Italian one, because although state 
subventions do cover a certain portion of the expenses sustained by German parties to 
finance their activities, they do not represent the single most important source of income. 
This difference is due to the fact that one of the provisions of the German party finance 
law
23 establishes that state contributions cannot be larger than the sum of all the other 
financial resources that a party collects with its own autonomous activities, i.e. state 
subventions cannot represent more than 50 % of a party’s total income
24. In this way, the 
German party finance law managed to preserve the financial benefits associated with 
party members and, by doing so, it created an incentive for parties to recruit and maintain 
a large membership base. Data are reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
  The third potential benefit associated with party members is that they may work 
and campaign for their party at no cost. The 1968 and 1996 Italian data allow to 
investigate whether this is actually the case, as both surveys asked party members 
whether they try to convince friends, relatives and colleagues. Note, however, that the 
data provided by the two Italian surveys cannot be compared with each other because the 
wording of the 1968 question is different from the wording of the 1996 question. The 
respondents to the 1968 survey were, in fact, asked, whether they try to convince any 
                                                           
23 BT-Drucks. 14/41 of November 17, 1998 and BT-Plenarprotokoll 14/11 of December 3, 1996, p.669 B. 
For a discussion of the German party finance law and its changes over time see, Thomas Poguntke, “Parties 
in a Legalistic Culture: The Case of Germany”, in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Parties 
Organize, op. cit. , pp. 185-215; Arthur B. Gunlicks, “The New German Party Finance Law”, German 
Politics, vol. 4, n. 1, (April) 1995, pp. 101-121; Martin Morlok, “Finanziamento della Politica e 
Corruzione: il Caso Tedesco”, Quaderni Costituzionali, anno XIX, n. 2, (Agosto) 1999, pp. 257-272; 
Massimo Teodori, Soldi e Politica. Quanto costa la democrazia in Italia?, Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie, 1999, 
pp. 202-204; Peter Pulzer, “Votes and Resources: Political Finance in Germany”, German Politics and 
Society, vol. 19, n. 1 (58), 2001, pp. 1-36. 
  16member of their circle of friends to vote as they did, while the respondents to the 1996 
survey were asked whether they try to convince friends, relatives and colleagues
 when 
they have a political opinion.
25 Given these differences, it would not be entirely correct to 
conclude, on the basis of the data reported in Table 7, that members and nonmembers 
have become more involved in party activity from 1968 to 1996. These data are, 
nonetheless, very suggestive in at least two respects: first, because they show that the 
percentage of members advising friends and relatives how to vote as well as the 
percentage of members trying to convince relatives and friends is significantly larger than 
the percentage of ordinary citizens reporting to do so both in 1968 and in 1996. Second, 
because data seem to show that the differences in the behavior of members and ordinary 
citizens, as measured by the gamma correlations, has declined from the late 1960s to the 
mid-1990s. In fact, while the gamma correlations had a value of 0.80 in 1968, it had a 
value of 0.61 in 1996. Interesting as these data may be, they do not show whether 
membership is a determinant of (higher levels) partisan activity, or whether party 
membership and partisan activity are correlated because they both respond to the same 
set of underlying factors such as party identification. When party identification is 
controlled, the gamma correlation changes from 0.61 for the uncontrolled relationship 
observed in 1996 to 0.56 and 0.07 for the two values of party identification. 
[Table 7 about here] 
From the point of view of parties, there are also several costs associated with party 
membership. As Katz pointed out “quite aside from the material costs of recruitment, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 This disposition is known as the relative Obergrenze. 
25 The question in 1968 asked the following; “Did you try to convince any of your circle of friends to vote 
as you did? “, while the 1996 question asked the following: “If you have an opinion on  political or 
electoral issue, do you attempt to convince your friends, relatives and colleagues?”. 
  17organizational overhead, and the possible need to devote party resources to the provision 
of nonpolitical selective benefits for members, members may impose other costs on a 
party”
26. For example, party members may seek party aid more often than non-members. 
The Dutch data allow to investigate whether this is, in fact, the case as the respondents in 
the 1971, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 Dutch surveys were asked whether 
they had sought party aid in the past. To the extent to which seeking party aid represents 
a cost for the party, the analysis of the data presented in Table 8 suggests two 
considerations. The first consideration is that party members represent and have always 
represented in the period under study a cost for the party, because the percentage of party 
members seeking party aid has always been significantly larger than the percentage of 
non-members reporting a similar behavior. The second consideration is that the costs 
associated with party members not only exist (and, one should note have existed in the 
past three decades) but that they have also increased both in absolute and in relative 
terms. In the first respect, it is possible to note that the percentage of party members 
seeking party aid has increased
27 from less than one member out of four in 1971 to almost 
one member out of three in 1998. Far more interesting is to note that the difference 
between the percentage of members and that of non-members seeking party aid has also 
increased in the course of the past three decades from about 18 percentage points in 1971 
to almost 23 percentage points in 1998
28. Although, the evidence provided by the British, 
Italian and German survey data does not allow to assess whether the costs of party 
membership have followed the upward trend observed in the Dutch case, additional 
                                                           
26 Richard S. Katz, “Party as linkage: A vestigial function?”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 
18, 1990, p. 152. 
27 The correlation between the percentage of party members seeking party aid and time has a Pearson r 
coefficient of .523. 
  18evidence of the costs associated with party membership can be found in the 1998 German 
survey data. In fact, the respondents to the 1998 German survey were asked whether they 
would seek party aid in order to exercise political influence over an issue which they 
consider important for them
29. This 5 point scale variable was then transformed into a 
dummy variable, with value 1 for respondents reporting that they would probably or that 
they would absolutely seek party aid and value 0 otherwise. Data reported in Table 8 
provide some evidence on the relationship between party membership and seeking party 
aid, and they show that party members are indeed more likely than ordinary citizens to 
seek party aid. When asked whether they would seek party aid
30, about 71.6% of the 
party members gave an affirmative answer in contrast to just 37.7 % of the ordinary 
citizens
31.  
[Table 8 about here] 
In sum, the data discussed in the previous sections suggest that party membership has 
become increasingly economically inefficient from the point of view of political parties 
not only because the benefits associated with party membership have declined but also 
because the costs associated with party membership have increased. Vanishing benefits 
and rising costs have depressed the quantity of members demanded and this, in turn, has 
exercised a negative influence on the total number of members joining political parties. 
Note, however, that where the benefits associated with party members have survived 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 The increase in the value of the gamma coefficients also testifies to the growing differences in the 
behavior of members and non-members. 
29 The wording of the question was the following: “Wenn Sie in einer für Sie wichtigen Sache politichen 
Einfluss nehmen und Ihren Standpunkt zur Geltung bringen wollten, welche der Folgenden Dingen würden 
Sie denn tun. Bitte sagen Sie es mir anhand dieser Skala. Um politischen Einfluss zu nehmen, würde ich 
versuchen von einer Partei Unterstützung zu bekommen”. 
30 The German words are “versuchen von einer Partei Unterstützung zu bekommen”. 
31 These percentage refer to the percentage of respondents who said that they would probably or would 
absolutely seek party aid.  
  19virtually undiminished, as in the case of the financial benefits associated with German 
party members, the demand for members has not undergone a decline comparable to the 
one observed in the other countries. 
 
The Vanishing Supply of Members 
Although the data presented in the previous section show that party membership 
has become increasingly inefficient for parties and that this, in turn, may have depressed 
the demand for members, they do not provide sufficient evidence as to why party 
membership levels have actually declined in the absence of information concerning the 
supply of party members. The purpose of the present section is to fill this information gap 
by assessing whether party membership decline is associated with, or rather caused by the 
vanishing benefits that members once derived from joining a party, from the rising costs 
of being a party member, or from an interaction of both these factors. 
From the point of view of party members, there are several potential benefits  
associated with party membership. As Katz put it, party membership may be a valuable 
source of information, may lead to preferential treatment at the hands of elected officials, 
may be a source of social and psychological rewards and, last but not least, it may give 
members greater policy influence
32. Although the survey data analyzed in the course of 
the present research do not provide evidence on most of these potential benefits, they 
allow nonetheless to investigate whether members perceive themselves to have a greater 
influence on the party, its decision and the policy making. The respondents to the 1998 
German survey were asked whether they agreed with the statement ‘even for simple party 
                                                           
32 Richard S. Katz, “Party as linkage”, op. cit., pp.154-156. 
  20members it is possible to bring their opinion in the party’
33. The results, presented in 
Table 9, show that the percentage of party members agreeing or agreeing strongly with 
the above mentioned statement is considerably higher than the percentage of non-
members: almost 46% of the party members either agreed or agreed strongly that party 
members can express their opinion in the parties, while less than 33% of the non-
members shared this view. In other words, although these findings do not provide any 
evidence as to whether there are real, objective benefits associated with party 
membership, they nonetheless sustain the claim that party members are more likely than 
non-members to perceive that there are some benefits associated with party membership.  
[Table 9 about here] 
  Interesting as these findings may be, they do not show whether party membership 
is the cause of members’ confidence in their political influence or not. In fact, one could 
argue that party members are a self-selected sample of citizens particularly interested in 
politics who believe that it is still possible to influence policy making process
34, but that 
party membership does not have any additional net effect on the sense of political 
efficacy of members. This can be investigated by controlling the relationship between 
party membership with the perceived policy influence of party members by controlling 
for efficacy. By controlling for efficacy, the value of the gamma correlation declines 
from 0.27 for the uncontrolled relationship between party membership and members’ 
perceived influence to 0.23 and 0.23 for the two levels of efficacy. This finding suggests 
                                                           
33 The exact wording of the question was the following: Auch einfachen Mitgliedern ist es möglich ihre 
Vorstellung in den Parteien einzubringen. 
34 Such an argument would not be arbitary at all. The respondents to 1998 German survey were asked 
whether they agreed with the statement ‘people like me have no influence on the regime’. Interestingly, 
54.6% of the 172 party members surveyed disagreed or disagreed strongly with this statement. On the 
contrary, only 34 % of the ordinary citizens disagreed or disagreed strongly with the same statement.  
  21that it is party membership itself that makes people believe in the benefits associated with 
party membership. 
  This said, do members believe that their policy influence and the other benefits 
associated with membership have declined over time? Since time series data are not 
available, I will use differences between age groups as a surrogate for time series data. 
Specifically, all the respondents in the 45-92 year age-range were coded as ‘old’, while 
all the respondents in the 44-16 age-range were coded as ‘young’. When the controlling 
for age, I find that the relationship between the perceived policy influence of party 
members and party membership is much weaker for the young than for the old (38% of 
the young versus 50% of the old) and this, in turn, suggests that members perceive that 
their policy influence has declined over time.  
Beneficial as it may be, party membership is not costless. First of all, party 
members have to pay their annual fees to enjoy the dubious benefits of the membership 
status. Second, members have to devote some of their free time to participate in party 
activities or attend party meetings where members’ opinions can rarely be expressed and, 
when expressed, are systematically discounted. Finally, members are often required, in 
order to be good and loyal members, to give up some of their intellectual freedom and 
accept the decisions taken by the party. These costs are not unbearable per sé, but they 
become unbearable “as alternative means to the same ends become more attractive”
35. 
The data presented in Table 10 suggest that party members are more likely, 
though not always in a significant way, to get involved in any form of political action 
than ordinary citizens. In fact, party members are significantly more likely to contact a 
members of the parliament, to activate an interest groups, to seek party aid, to contact a 
  22mayor, an alderman or a members of the municipal council and to join a civic action 
group. The significance in each of these case is 95% level or higher. Party members are 
also more likely than non-members to contact a cabinet minister, sign a petition and 
participate in a demonstration. In each of these cases, the differences between members 
and non-members are significant at the 90% level, but not at the 95% level. Finally, the 
percentage of party members activating radio and/or TV, lodging a complaint or 
contacting a departmental official is not significantly different from the percentage of 
non-members. 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
  Looking at the two age groups is of particular interest, for it highlights three 
peculiarities. First of all, in every case the gamma correlation for the older age group is 
positive, while the gamma correlation for the younger age group is negative in two 
instances (contacting a cabinet minister and contacting a departmental official).  
Second, in five cases the correlation is stronger for the older group, while in the 
remaining cases the correlation is stronger for the younger age group.  
Third, and more interestingly, the data reveal two major differences between the 
older and the younger groups: first, the older group is more likely to get involved in more 
traditional forms of political action, while the younger group is more likely to participate 
in ‘unconventional’ political activities; second, the younger group is more inclined to act 
locally (by activating mayors, aldermen, members of the city council), while the older 
group is more inclined to contact politicians more detached from the local territory 
(cabinet minister, the members of the parliament). This finding has profound implications 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 Richard S. Katz, “Party as linkage”, op. cit., pp. 156-157. 
  23for my argument, because it suggests that the emergence (and availability) of new, 
unconventional forms of political action makes the traditional party activism and 
activities less cost-efficient, which means that, by eliminating the (economic) incentives 
to join a party, it ultimately paves the way to a vanishing supply of party members. 
 
Conclusions 
The findings presented in the course of this paper are significant for empirical, 
methodological and theoretical reasons. At the empirical level, the data discussed above 
are significant because they show that the levels of party membership have declined in 
most Western European democracies in the past three decades and that this decline is 
related, and in my view is caused by, a transformation in the structure of incentives: the 
benefits and the costs associated with party membership have changed in a way such that 
party members are not actively demanded by parties nor generously supplied by the 
population, and the decline in the quantity demanded and supplied, in turn, has lowered 
the quantity of members joining a political party. Interestingly, though, where the 
benefits associated with party membership have survived, as in the German case, not only 
the demand for members but also the number of members have not diminished. These 
findings have, of course, important implications for they show two things: first, that 
economic explanations of party membership and party membership change might explain 
transformations other than decline; second, that there is nothing inevitable in the decline 
of party membership and party membership organizations. 
At the methodological level, the analyses performed in this paper also represent 
an important contribution to the understanding of party membership and party 
  24membership change in Western European democracies for several reasons. The first, and 
the most obvious of which, is that I showed that the economic explanation of party 
membership remains a valid analytical framework even when it is applied to a larger 
range of cases. This has two quite important implications, from an epistemic point of 
view, because my analyses did not simply increase the explanatory power of the 
economic framework, but they also, and simultaneously, increased its reliability. In other 
words, the economic explanation is further corroborated by the findings presented in this 
paper. The second, and not less important, reason is that my survey analyses were 
performed with better data, because instead of investigating temporal trends with age 
differences, I relied, whenever it was possible to do so, on the methodologically more 
appropriate time series data. 
At the theoretical level, the findings presented in this paper provide some 
evidence with regard to the cartel party hypothesis in two different, though related, ways. 
First, the party membership decline observed above is a sign of the increasing detachment 
between parties and society and, as such, it corroborates one of the postulates of the cartel 
party hypothesis. Second, and more importantly, the data reported in Tables 5 and 6 
support the cartel party hypothesis in another respect, as they show, as Katz and Mair 
hypothesized, that one of the most significant determinants of the growing detachment 
between parties and society has been and still is the availability of state resources and 
public funding to political parties. In fact, data make clear that the introduction of public 
subventions reduced, if not eliminated, the financial benefits associated with party 
members and this, in turn, depressed parties’ demand for members. The comparison of 
the German and the Italian case is, in this regard, absolutely enlightening: in Italy, where 
  25the financial benefits associated with party membership were dramatically undermined by 
the very generous Italian party finance legislation, parties’ demand for members 
decreased and the number of party members declined even before the eruption of the 
Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal which, incidentally, marked the end of some of the 
historical Italian parties; on the contrary, in Germany where the party finance legislation 
preserved the financial benefits associated with party membership, parties’ demand for 
members did not vanish and the number of members did not drop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  26Table 1: Party Membership in Western Europe: 1980-2000 
Country, year  Electorate 
(E) 
Total party 
Membership 
(M) 
Membership as % 
of the electorate 
(M/E) 
Austria     
1970  5,045,841 1,308,302 25.92 
1975  5,019,277 1,286,964 25.64 
1980 5,186,735  (79)  1,477,261  28.48 
1985   1,257,481   
1990  5,628,099 1,334,554 23.71 
1999  5,838,373 1,031,052 17.66 
Belgio     
1970 6,271,240  (71)  494,672  7.88 
1975 6,322,227  (74)  580,145  9.17 
1980 6,878,141  (81)  617,186  8.97 
1985 7,001,297  602,621  8.60 
1990 7,039,350  (87)  644,110  9.15 
1999 7,343,464  480,804  6.55 
Denmark     
1970 3,332,044  (71)  473,891  14.22 
1975 3,447,621  349,402  10.13 
1980 3,776,333  (81)  275,767  7.30 
1985 3,829,600  (84)  274,717  7.17 
1989 3,941,499  (90)  231,846  5.88 
1998 3,993,099  205,382  5.14 
France     
1978 34,394,378  1,737,347  5.05 
1988 36,977,321  1,110,398  2.98 
1999 39,215,743  (97)  615,219  1.57 
Germany      
1970 38,677,325  (69)  1,205,972  3.12 
1975 42,058,015  (76)  1,795,576  4.27 
1980 (west)  43,231,741  1,955,140  4.52 
1985 45,327,982  (87)  1,920,614  4.24 
1989 (west)  48,099,251  1,873,053  3.89 
1999 60,762,751  1,780,173  2.93 
Ireland     
1980 2,275,450  113,856  5.00 
1985 2,445,515  (87)  123,837  5.06 
1987 2,445,515  134,477  5.50 
1990 2,471,308  120,228  4.86 
1998 2,741,262  86,000  3.14 
Italy      
1970 35,566,681  (68)  4,037,182  11.35 
1975 40,423,131  (76)  4,524,259  11.19 
1980 42,181,664  (79)  4,073,927  9.66 
1989 45,583,499  (87)  4,150,071  9.10 
1990 45,583,499  (87)  4,297,046  9.42 
1991 45,583,499  (87)  3,442,191  7.55 
1992 47,780,167  1,361,910  2.84 
1993 47,780,167  (92)  1,946,613  4.07 
1994 48,135,041  1,438,752  2.99 
1995 48,135,041  (94)  1,710,969  3.55 
1998 48,744,846  (96)  1,974,040  4.05 
Table 1: Party Membership in Western Europe: 1980-2000 
  27Country, year  Electorate 
(E) 
Total party 
Membership 
(M) 
Membership as % 
of the electorate 
(M/E) 
Netherlands     
1970 8,048,726  (71)  358,194  4.45 
1975 9,506,318  (77)  351,139  3.69 
1980 10,040,121  (81)  430,928  4.29 
1985 10,727,701  (86)  346,645  3.23 
1989 11,112,189  354,915  3.19 
2000 11,755,132  (98)  294,469  2.51 
Norway     
1980 3,003,093  (81)  460,913  15.35 
1985 3,100,479  441,370  14.23 
1990 3,190,311  (89)  418,953  13.13 
1997 3,311,190  242,022  7.31 
Sweden     
1980 6,040,461  (79)  508,121  8.41 
1989 6,330,023  (88)  506,337  8.00 
1998 6,601,766  365,588  5.54 
United Kingdom     
1974 39,753,863    2,381,889  5.99 
1980 41,095,490  (79)  1,693,156  4.12 
1982 42,192,999  (83)  1,544,803  3.66 
1989 43,180,573  (87)  1,136,723  2.63 
1998 43,818,324  (97)  840,000  1.92 
Source: For the 1970-1990 period data are taken from Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), Party 
Organizations. A Data Handbook, London, SAGE Publications, 1992. The data for the 1990-2000 period 
are taken from Peter Mair and Ingrid von Biezen, “Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 
1980-2000”, Party Politics, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 5-21. Additional Italian data are taken from the website of the 
Istituto Cattaneo of Bologna. Note that only the 1991 membership figures for the Northern League were 
disclosed by the LN. The Dc/Ppi data were no disclosed for 1992. The Pri membership figures for 1992, 
1993 and 1995 were estimates provided by the party. The Belgian party membership figures do not report 
the data concerning the Pcb/Kpb. The Austrian party membership data do not provide any evidence as to 
the Kpö. The Danish membership figures do not report the figures of Cd and Frp in 1970 and of Frp in 
1975. The German membership figures do not report the data concern ing the Csu in 1970. With regard to 
the Irish data, the missing data have been estimated as follows: the figures for the Workers Party have been 
estimated as follows: 1987 as the average between 1985 and 1990. The British membership figures for 
1974 do not report the data concerning the Sdp, while they do not report the data concerning the Liberal 
party for 1982. The Dutch membership figures for 1970, 1975 and 1985 do not include the members of 
Sgp, Gpv and Rpf. Some of the Norwegian membership data were missing. Missing data have been 
estimated as follows: the 1985 figure for the V is estimated as equal to the average of 1984 and 1986; the 
1985 figure for the Frp is estimated as equal to the average of 1982 and 1989. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  28Table 2: Party Membership change, 1970-2000: M/E ratios and absolute numbers 
Country  Period  Change in  
M/E ratio 
Change in 
numbers of 
members 
Change in 
numbers as 
percentage of 
original 
membership 
United Kingdom  1974-1998  -4.07  -1,541,889  -64.73 
France 1978-1999  -3.48  -1,122,128  -64.59 
Denmark 1970-1998  -9.09  -268,509 -56.66 
Italy 1970-1998  -7.30  -2,063,142  -51.10 
Norway 1980-1997  -8.04  -218,891  -47.49 
Sweden   1980-1998  -2.87  -142,533  -28.05 
Ireland 1980-1998  -1.86  -27,856  -24.47 
Austria 1970-1999  -8.26  -277,250  -21.20 
Netherlands 1970-2000  -1.94  -63,725  -17.79 
Belgium 1970-1999  -1.33  -13,868  -2.76 
Germany 1970-1999  -0.19  +574,201 +47.6 
 
 
 
Table 3. Self-reported party membership. 
Country Year  %  N 
                                          of 
Germany 1969  3.5  1100 
Germany 1972  4.4  1193 
Germany 1994  2.2  1994 
Germany 1998  5.0  3303 
Italy 1968  9.5  1841 
Italy 1972  8.4  927 
Italy 1996  6.2  2516 
Netherlands 1971  11.7  2486 
Netherlands 1981  8.6  2292 
Netherlands 1982  8.6  2473 
Netherlands 1986  7.9  1629 
Netherlands 1989  7.6  1751 
Netherlands 1994  5.6  1809 
Netherlands 1998  4.3  2101 
United Kingdom  1983  7.0  3942 
United Kingdom  1987  5.9  3816 
United Kingdom  1997  4.1  3599 
 
Source: The 1969 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 0525 Titel: Politik in der 
Bundesrepublik (August 1969) Erhebungszeitraum: August 1969 bis September 1969 Primärforscher: M. 
Kaase, U. Schleth, R. Wildenmann, Lehrstuhl für politische Wissenschaft, Universität Mannheim 
Datenerhebung: INFRATEST, München. The 1972 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 
0635 Titel: Wahlstudie 1972 (Panel: Voruntersuchung, September - Oktober 1972) Erhebungszeitraum: 
September 1972 bis Oktober 1972 Primärforscher: M. Berger, W. G. Gibowski, M. Kaase, D. Roth, U. 
Schleth, R. Wildenmann, Lehrstuhl für politische Wissenschaft, Universität Mannheim Datenerhebung: 
INFRATEST, München. The 1994 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 2601 Titel: 
Nachwahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 1994 Erhebungszeitraum: Oktober 1994 bis November 1994 
Primärforscher: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; ZUMA, Mannheim; in Zusammenarbeit mit: M. Berger, M. 
Jung, D. Roth, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim; in Zusammenarbeit mit: W.G. Gibowski, 
Bundespresseamt, Bonn; M. Kaase, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; H.D. Klingemann, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; M. Küchler, Hunter College New York; F.U. Pappi, Universität Mannheim; 
H.A. Semetko, Syracuse University Datenerhebung: GFM-GETAS, Hamburg. The 1998 German data are 
  29taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 3066 Titel: Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und 
Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998. The 1968 Italian data are taken from Samuel H. Barnes, 
Italian Mass Election Survey, 1968 (ICPSR 7953), First ICPSR Edition 1982, Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (producer and distributor); the 
1972 Italian survey data are taken from Samuel H. Barnes and Giacomo Sani, Italian Mass Election Survey, 
1972 (ICPSR 7954), First Edition ICPSR 1982, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (producer and distributor); the 1996 Italian Survey data are 
made available by the Istituto Cattaneo. The 1971 Dutch data are taken from Robert J. Mokken and Frans 
M. Roschar, Dutch Parliamnetary Election Study, 1971 [computer file]. Conducted by N.V.V./H 
Nederlandse Stiching Voor Statistick. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI:Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1975.The 1986 Dutch data are taken from C. van der Eijk, , 
G.A. Irwin, and B. Niemoeller. Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1986 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Interuniversity Election Study Workgroup [producer], 1988. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [distributor], 1994. The 1989 Dutch data are taken from H. Anker and E.V. 
Oppenhuis, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1989 [computer file]. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch 
Electoral Bureau of Statistics [producers], 1993. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann 
Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1994. The 1994 
Dutch data are taken from H. Anker and E.V. Oppenhuis, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1994 
[computer file], 2
nd ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Electoral Research Foundation 
(SKON)/Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) [producers], 1995. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: 
Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributors], 1997. The 1998 Dutch data are taken from Kees Aarts, Henk van der Kolk and Marlies 
Kamp, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1998 [computer file]. ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands:NIWI-Steinmetz Archive/Dutch Electoral Research Foundation (SKON) [producers], 1999. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands:NIWI/Steinmetz Archive/Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische 
Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributors], 1999. The 1983 British data are taken from A. Heath, R. Jowell and J.K. Curtice, British 
General Election Study 1983 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: Uk Data Archive [distributor], 1983. 
SN:2005. The 1987 British data are taken from A. Heath, R. Jowell and J.K.Curtice, British General 
Election Study 1987 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 21 April 1993. 
SN:2568. The 1997 British data are taken from A. Heath et alii, British General Election Study 1997 
[computer file]. 2
nd ed., Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 28 May 1999. SN:3887. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  30Table 4. Party Voting Loyalty and  Party Membership. 
 Members  Non-members  Gamma 
Germany      
Voted for the same party in 1965 as in 1969  92.0 % of 25  76.8 % of 768  0.55 
Voted for the same party in 1969 as in 1972  88.0 % of 50  77.6 % of 937  0.36 
Voted for the same party in 1990 as in 1994  81.5 % of 38  78.8 % of 1138  0.09 
Italy      
Always voted for the same party before 1968  95.8 % of 72  78.3 % of 758  0.73 
Always voted for the same party before 1972  89.0 % of 173  76.6 % of 1606  0.42 
Voted for the same party in 1968 as in 1972  92.7 % of 165  85.4 % of 1286  0.37 
Voted for the same party in 1994 as in 1996  75.7 % of 132  61.7 % of 1795  0.32 
The Netherlands       
Always voted for the same party before 1971  94.4 % of 253  83.6 % of 1307  0.54 
Always voted for the same party before 1981  61.5 % of 148  50.6 % of 1248  0.22 
Voted for the same party in 1977 as in 1981  89.0 % of 146  77.7 % of 1159  0.40 
Voted for the same party in 1981 as in 1982  96.8 % of 221  82.7 % of 1911  0.73 
Voted for the same party in 1982 as in 1986  88.6 % of 114  75.9 % of 985  0.42 
Voted for the same party in 1986 as in 1989  90.4 % of 115  77.0 % of 1116  0.48 
Voted for the same party in 1989 as in 1994  88.2 % of 85  70.1 % of 1041  0.52 
Voted for the same party in 1994 as in 1998  92.2 % of 77  67.1 % of 1305  0.70 
United Kingdom       
Voted for the same party in 1979 as in 1983  84.8 % of 243  71.3 % of 2454  0.38 
Voted for the same party in 1983 as in 1987  96.7 % of 215  78.9 % of 2468  0.77 
Voted for the same party in 1992 as in 1997  93.9 % of 132  74.6 % of 2264  0.68 
      
Source: The 1969 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 0525 Titel: Politik in der 
Bundesrepublik (August 1969) Erhebungszeitraum: August 1969 bis September 1969 Primärforscher: M. 
Kaase, U. Schleth, R. Wildenmann, Lehrstuhl für politische Wissenschaft, Universität Mannheim 
Datenerhebung: INFRATEST, München. The 1972 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 
0635 Titel: Wahlstudie 1972 (Panel: Voruntersuchung, September - Oktober 1972) Erhebungszeitraum: 
September 1972 bis Oktober 1972 Primärforscher: M. Berger, W. G. Gibowski, M. Kaase, D. Roth, U. 
Schleth, R. Wildenmann, Lehrstuhl für politische Wissenschaft, Universität Mannheim Datenerhebung: 
INFRATEST, München. The 1994 German data are taken from the ZA-Studiennummer: 2601 Titel: 
Nachwahlstudie zur Bundestagswahl 1994 Erhebungszeitraum: Oktober 1994 bis November 1994 
Primärforscher: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; ZUMA, Mannheim; in Zusammenarbeit mit: M. Berger, M. 
Jung, D. Roth, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim; in Zusammenarbeit mit: W.G. Gibowski, 
Bundespresseamt, Bonn; M. Kaase, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; H.D. Klingemann, 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; M. Küchler, Hunter College New York; F.U. Pappi, Universität Mannheim; 
H.A. Semetko, Syracuse University Datenerhebung: GFM-GETAS, Hamburg. The 1968 Italian data are 
taken from Samuel H. Barnes, Italian Mass Election Survey, 1968 (ICPSR 7953), First ICPSR Edition 
1982, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (producer and distributor); the 1972 Italian survey data are taken from Samuel H. Barnes and 
Giacomo Sani, Italian Mass Election Survey, 1972 (ICPSR 7954), First Edition ICPSR 1982, Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (producer and 
distributor); the 1996 Italian Survey data are made available by the Istituto Cattaneo. The 1971 Dutch data 
are taken from Robert J. Mokken and Frans M. Roschar, Dutch Parliamnetary Election Study, 1971 
[computer file]. Conducted by N.V.V./H Nederlandse Stiching Voor Statistick. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, 
MI:Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1975. The 
1986 Dutch data are taken from C. van der Eijk,  G.A. Irwin, and B. Niemoeller. Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Study, 1986 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Interuniversity 
Election Study Workgroup [producer], 1988. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, 
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. The 1989 Dutch data 
are taken from H. Anker and E.V. Oppenhuis, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1989 [computer file]. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Electoral Bureau of Statistics [producers], 1993. Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributors], 1994. The 1994 Dutch data are taken from H. Anker and E.V. Oppenhuis, Dutch 
  31Parliamentary Election Study, 1994 [computer file], 2
nd ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: 
Dutch Electoral Research Foundation (SKON)/Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) [producers], 
1995. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributors], 1997. The 1998 Dutch data are taken from Kees Aarts, Henk 
van der Kolk and Marlies Kamp, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1998 [computer file]. ICPSR 
version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands:NIWI-Steinmetz Archive/Dutch Electoral Research Foundation 
(SKON) [producers], 1999. Amsterdam, the Netherlands:NIWI/Steinmetz Archive/Koeln, Germany: 
Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [distributors], 1999. The 1983 British data are taken from A. Heath, R. Jowell and J.K. 
Curtice, British General Election Study 1983 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: Uk Data Archive 
[distributor], 1983. SN:2005. The 1987 British data are taken from A. Heath, R. Jowell and J.K.Curtice, 
British General Election Study 1987 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 21 
April 1993. SN:2568. The 1997 British data are taken from A. Heath et alii, British General Election Study 
1997 [computer file]. 2
nd ed., Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 28 May 1999. SN:3887. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Membership Fees and State Subventions as proportion  
of Party Total Expenses in Italy, 1974-1999. 
Year Membership  fees 
as proportion of 
Total Expenses 
State Subventions 
as proportion of 
Total Expenses 
Total Expenses 
in Billion Lire 
1974   68  66 
1979   35  127 
1984   34  245 
1987   27  304 
1990 32.7  34.8  330 
1991 34.1  29.7  300 
1992 12.8  36.4  316 
1993 4.0  53.6  156 
1994 3.1  72.2  213 
1995 8.6  39.6  143 
1996 9.7  60.4  158 
1997 11.1  98.4  164 
1998 14.1  74.6  149 
1999 9.1  63.1  275 
Source: the data for the years from 1974 to 1987 are taken from Massimo Teodori,  
Soldi e partiti. Quanto costa la democrazia in Italia?, Firenze, Ponte alle Grazie,  
1999, p.270. The data for the 1990-1999 period are taken from the Gazzetta Ufficiale. 
The computations were made by the author.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32Table 6 Membership Fees and State Subventions as Proportion of Party Total  
Expenses in Germany, 1986-1998. 
Year Membership  fees 
as proportion of 
Total Expenses 
State Subventions 
as proportion of 
Total Expenses 
Total Expenses 
in Million DM 
1986 38.3  26.2  545 
1987 42.6  34.1  531 
1988 51.2  29.4  446 
1989 38.1  27.6  618 
1990 15.1  22.1  1817 
1991 42.9  23.1  697 
1992 51.9  26.4  582 
1993 50.7  28.2  607 
1994 30.9  33.3  995 
1995 50.1  35.4  637 
1996 47.9  32.9  670 
1997 54.0  37.4  606 
1998 35.8  25.4  913 
Source: the data for the 1986-1998 period are taken from he website of the 
German Bundestag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Party Membership and Party Activity. 
 Members  Non-members  Gamma 
Italy 1968       
Did you try to convince any of your circle of friends 
to vote as you did? 
58.4 % of 77  13.5 % of 839  0.80 
Italy 1996       
If you have an opinion on  political or electoral 
issue, do you attempt to convince your friends, 
relatives and colleagues 
70.9 % of 153  40.6 % of 2334  0.58 
Source: The 1968 Italian data are taken from Samuel H. Barnes, Italian Mass Election Survey, 1968 
(ICPSR 7953), First ICPSR Edition 1982, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (producer and distributor); the 1996 Italian Survey data are 
made available by the Istituto Cattaneo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  33Table 8. Party Membership and Seeking Party Aid. 
 Members  Non-members  Gamma 
Germany 1998       
Would you seek party aid?  71.6 % of 169  37.7 % of 2999  0.61 
Netherlands      
Has sought party aid in the past? (1971)  23.0 % of 242  5.0 % of 1694  0.68 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1981)  29.8 % of 151  4.4 % of 1442  0.80 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1982)  34.2 % of 114  3.9 % of 1395  0.85 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1986)  27.1 % of 118  5.7 % of 1220  0.72 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1989)  40.7 % of 118  8.5 % of 1386  0.76 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1994)  40.0 % of 90  4.5 % of 1422  0.87 
Has sought party aid in the past? (1998)  28.8 % of 80  6.0 % of 1734  0.73 
Source: The 1998 German data are taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 3066 Titel: Politische Einstellungen, 
politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998. The 1971 Dutch data are 
taken from Robert J. Mokken and Frans M. Roschar, Dutch Parliamnetary Election Study, 1971 [computer 
file]. Conducted by N.V.V./H Nederlandse Stiching Voor Statistick. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI:Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1975.The 1986 Dutch 
data are taken from C. van der Eijk, , G.A. Irwin, and B. Niemoeller. Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 
1986 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Interuniversity Election Study 
Workgroup [producer], 1988. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. The 1989 Dutch data are taken 
from H. Anker and E.V. Oppenhuis, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1989 [computer file]. 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Dutch Electoral Bureau of Statistics [producers], 1993. Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributors], 1994. The 1994 Dutch data are taken from H. Anker and E.V. Oppenhuis, Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Study, 1994 [computer file], 2
nd ICPSR version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: 
Dutch Electoral Research Foundation (SKON)/Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) [producers], 
1995. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributors], 1997. The 1998 Dutch data are taken from Kees Aarts, Henk 
van der Kolk and Marlies Kamp, Dutch Parliamentary Election Study, 1998 [computer file]. ICPSR 
version. Amsterdam, the Netherlands:NIWI-Steinmetz Archive/Dutch Electoral Research Foundation 
(SKON) [producers], 1999. Amsterdam, the Netherlands:NIWI/Steinmetz Archive/Koeln, Germany: 
Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research [distributors], 1999. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Party Membership and Members Policy Influence. 
 Members  Non-members  gamma 
Germany 1998       
It is possible for the simple party 
member to bring his opinion to the 
party? 
45.6 % of 169  32.6 % of 2769  0.27 
      
Source: The 1998 German data are taken from ZA-Studiennummer: 3066 Titel: Politische Einstellungen, 
politische Partizipation und Wählerverhalten im vereinigten Deutschland 1998.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  34Table 10. gamma correlations between various political actions and party membership (Dutch 1998 
survey). 
 Total  Young    Old 
Contact a cabinet minister  0.49  -1.0  0.49 
Contact a member of the parliament  0.74  0.49  0.74 
Sign a petition  0.23  0.64  0.17 
Activate an interest group  0.49  0.57  0.42 
Activate radio and/or TV  0.32  0.49  0.24 
Seek party aid  0.73  0.37  0.74 
Activate mayor or alderman  0.39  0.53  0.27 
Activate member of municipal council  0.52  0.62  0.50 
Join a civic action group  0.36  0.05  0.52 
Join a demonstration  0.25  -0.01  0.42 
Activate a newspaper  0.36  0.32  0.36 
Lodge a complaint  0.09  0.20  0.01 
Contact a departmental official  .024  -1.0  0.32 
 
 
  35